This is a significant recent High Court decision on Hadkinson orders in children proceedings. The judgment was given on 11 June 2026 and subsequently reported as [2026] EWHC 2359 (Fam).
The important point is that non-compliance with a costs or other financial order does not ordinarily justify preventing a parent from pursuing an appeal concerning the welfare of a child.
What is a Hadkinson order?
The jurisdiction derives from Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P 285.
In broad terms, where a party is deliberately refusing to comply with a court order, the court can, in exceptional circumstances, say:
You cannot pursue your application or appeal unless and until you comply with the court’s existing order.
It is therefore a potentially severe procedural sanction. It can effectively stay or prevent an appeal from being heard.
A more modern and important authority is De Gafforj v De Gafforj (Appeal: Hadkinson Order) [2018] EWCA Civ 2070, where the Court of Appeal upheld a Hadkinson order in financial proceedings. In that case the husband’s failure to comply with financial orders was directly interfering with the wife’s ability to participate in the litigation.
What happened in P v R?
The important feature of P v R was that the proceedings concerned children.
One party sought Hadkinson relief which would, in substance, have prevented or stayed the other party’s appeal because of non-compliance with an order, including an outstanding costs obligation.
The High Court refused to make the Hadkinson order.
The crucial distinction was between:
financial litigation between adults
and
proceedings in which the court is required to consider the welfare of a child.
That distinction matters enormously.
Why was the order refused?
The difficulty with making a Hadkinson order in children proceedings is that it does not simply punish the defaulting parent.
It can prevent the court from considering an issue which potentially affects the child.
The reported summary of the decision captures the principle particularly clearly: a Hadkinson order staying or striking out appellate proceedings pending payment of costs will not be granted in children’s proceedings where the appeal concerns the welfare of the child, notwithstanding the parent’s non-compliance. Free
Put another way:
the child’s welfare cannot properly be used as leverage to secure payment of a parent’s debt or costs liability.
That is quite different from a purely financial remedy appeal where the dispute is essentially between the two adults.
The practical distinction
Imagine a father has been ordered to pay the mother’s costs of £20,000.
He does not pay.
He then appeals against a child arrangements order restricting his contact with the child.
The mother applies for a Hadkinson order saying:
“His appeal should not be heard until he pays the £20,000.”
Following P v R, the court should be extremely reluctant to do that.
The court still has mechanisms for enforcing the £20,000 costs order. But preventing consideration of an appeal potentially affecting the child’s welfare is a very different matter.
The child’s interests are not synonymous with either parent’s litigation conduct.
Does P v R mean Hadkinson orders are impossible in children cases?
The better reading is that the decision creates a very strong distinction, rather than giving a badly behaved litigant immunity from the consequences of non-compliance.
A parent can still face:
- enforcement of the unpaid order;
- costs consequences;
- findings concerning litigation conduct;
- other procedural consequences where appropriate.
But using a Hadkinson order to prevent determination of an appeal involving the child’s welfare creates a fundamental problem because the sanction potentially affects the child as well as the defaulting parent.
That explains why the decision is described as P v R (Refusal of Hadkinson Relief).
Relationship with De Gafforj
The contrast is particularly useful in practice.
In De Gafforj, the Court of Appeal was dealing with financial litigation. The husband’s failure to pay a legal services order directly impaired the wife’s ability to participate in the proceedings. The Hadkinson jurisdiction was therefore capable of being engaged.
In P v R, the subject matter was different. The appeal engaged children’s welfare, meaning the court could not simply approach the matter as litigation between two defaulting/compliant adults.
So the two cases can be reconciled:
De Gafforj: Hadkinson orders remain an exceptional but potentially powerful tool where deliberate non-compliance obstructs the administration of justice.
P v R: that principle cannot simply be transplanted into children proceedings where refusing to hear the case would interfere with the court’s consideration of the child’s welfare.
Why P v R matters for practitioners
The case gives a potentially strong answer where one parent argues:
“The other parent is in breach of an order, so their children appeal/application should not be heard.”
The response is that there are two separate issues:
1. Should the parent’s breach be enforced or sanctioned?
Potentially yes.
2. Should that breach prevent the court determining an issue concerning the child’s welfare?
P v R strongly indicates that the answer is different where the proposed Hadkinson relief would prevent determination of the welfare issue
It therefore reinforces an important conceptual point in children litigation: the proceedings are not simply a dispute between A and B. There is an independent welfare interest belonging to the child which the court must protect.
The case has already been identified by LexisNexis as one of the notable private-children developments in its September 2026 Family Law weekly update. LexisNexis
